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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JACK JAMES TRANE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990886-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of cocaine, a third degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 1999). This
Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
After defendant refused three times to submit to Officer Dobrowolski's orders
to submit to a protective frisk, was his subsequent arrest justified because: (a) he
lacked any right to resist a lawful order within the scope of Officer Dobrowolski's
authority as a peace officer; and/or (b) there was probable cause to believe that
defendant was publicly intoxicated?
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to these issues. The trial court's
underlying fact findings are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error."
The trial court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for correctness, allowing

some "measure of discretion" as regards the application of legal standards to the facts.
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and not Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
UTAH CODE ANN,

§ 76-8-305 (1999):

A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and
interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful
order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-7-16 (1999):

A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for questioning may
frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any
other person is in danger.

2

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-9-701(1) (1999):

A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol, a
controlled substance, or any substance having the property of releasing
toxic vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another,
in a public place or in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other
persons.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of controlled substance (cocaine), a third
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998); intoxication, a
class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-701(1)( 1999); and
interference with a peace officer making an arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-8-305(2) (1999) (R. 17-19).

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine seized incident to his arrest (R.
42-49). A hearing on the motion was held on 2 March 1999, following which the motion
was denied (R. 166:81-85). The trial court entered written findings of fact and
conclusions of law in support of its ruling on 21 June 1999 (R. 110-113) (a copy of the
written ruling is contained in addendum A).
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the third degree felony
offense and the remaining charges were dismissed (R. 114-120) (a copy of the plea
agreement is contained in addendum B). The trial court imposed an indeterminate term
offrom0-5 years and various fines and fees (R. 123-125). The trial court then stayed the
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sentence and placed defendant on a 36 month term of probation (id.). Defendant timely
appealed (R. 126).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
At 4:15 a.m. on 26 November 1998, Officer Kent Bushman investigated a report of
a male harassing customers and a clerk at the Circle K Store located at the intersection of
700 East and 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 166:5, 16, 34). As Officer Bushman
approached the Circle K, the clerk motioned toward defendant (R. 166:6). Officer
Bushman smelled alcohol coming from defendant's person and also observed that
defendant was behaving in a loud and tumultuous manner (R. 166:8,19-20, 22).
Defendant refused to provide Officer Bushman with his identification, stating instead that
it was the clerk that needed to be dealt with (R. 166:7). Defendant also "stood into a
typical boxing stance, puffed his chest out, and just took a defensive posture similar to a
boxer" (R. 166:8). Officer Bushman suspected defendant was disturbing the peace and/or
was publicly intoxicated (id.). Defendant's angry and uncooperative behavior also caused
Officer Bushman to be concerned for his safety (id.). In Officer Bushman's experience,
intoxicated people are unpredictable and sometimes violent (R. 166:3-5). Officer
Bushman thus called for backup (R. 166:9).

^he facts are stated in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying
defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App.
1997).
4

While waiting for backup, Officer Bushman again requested defendant's
identification and explained that defendant was obligated to identify himself (R. 166:9).
Thereafter, defendant pulled out his wallet and Utah identification card, but would not
release his grip on the card when Officer Bushman reached for it (R. 166:9). Defendant
only let go of the card after the officer ordered him to do so and also pulled it from
defendant (R. 166:10,21).
Officer Dobrowolski arrived just as Officer Bushman obtained defendant's
identification (R. 166:10, 34, 47). Officer Bushman advised Officer Dobrowolski that
defendant was being "less than cooperative" and/or "belligerent," and that he was going
to run a warrants check (R. 166:11, 34-35, 47). Officer Bushman wanted Officer
Dobrowolski to be aware of defendant's uncooperative behavior for purposes of safety:
"I didn't want Officer Dobrowolski to step into something without any information,
information that I had gathered from being there prior to, and just for Officer
Dobrowolski's personal safety" (R. 166:11). Officer Dobrowolski asked if defendant had
beenfriskedyet and Officer Bushman said, "No" (R. 166:34-35). Officer Dobrowolski
was also concerned about safety based on the information from Officer Bushman and
because defendant appeared intoxicated: "I thought that the two coupled made him a
possible danger to myself and I wanted to ensure that he didn't have any weapons" (R.
166:35).
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Accordingly, as Officer Bushman returned to his patrol vehicle to run the warrants
check, Officer Dobrowolski instructed defendant to put his hands on his head, interlock
his fingers and turn away from the officer so that he could be searched (R. 166:11, 35).
Defendant maintained his fighting stance and refused to comply (R. 166:11, 36).
Concerned about defendant's uncooperative behavior, Officer Bushman turned around to
observe the procedure (R. 166:11). Officer Dobrowolski repeated his request two more
times and defendant continued to refuse physically and verbally:
The first time I told him - and this is a memory but I'm sure if this is an
exact quote, but he kind of backed up like this, held his arms away, and
said, "That ain't happening, or something to that effect... it made me more
concerned. I was concerned now at this point that he knew of my intention
to search him and I was wondering if he had something he didn't want me
to find that could hurt me.
(R. 166:11-12,36,51).
Because defendant continued to resist the protective frisk, Officer Bushman
returned to assist Officer Dobrowolski (R. 166:11-12, 36-37). The officers then moved to
arrest defendant for interference with a peace officer (R. 166:38). Specifically, Officer
Dobrowolski took defendant's right arm and Officer Bushman took defendant's left arm
(R. 166:12). Defendant forcibly resisted and a struggle ensued (R. 166:12). Ultimately,
the trio ended up in the eastbound lands of 2700 South, approximately 10-12 feet from
where the struggle began (R. 166:12, 39). The officers subdued defendant with OC spray
before they successfully arrested him (R. 166:12-13, 53). Jail personnel searched
defendant and located rock cocaine on his person (R. 45, 54).
6

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Rock cocaine was seized from defendant's person during a search incident to his
arrest on several misdemeanor charges including interference with a peace officer, and
public intoxication. Pursuant to a plea bargain, these misdemeanor charges were
dismissed in exchange for defendant's guilty plea to a felony drug charge for possession
of cocaine. Defendant also reserved the right to challenge the validity of his arrest on the
misdemeanor charges on appeal.
Defendant Was Lawfully Arrested For Interference With a Peace Officer.
An order to submit to a protective frisk is well within the scope of a peace officer's
authority. Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, the attemptedfriskhere was ultimately
not justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant was potentially dangerous, defendant
lacked any right to resist the lawful order. Defendant's assertions to the contrary do not
comport with either the law or the policy applicable to this situation. Defendant's arrest
for interfering with the frisk, and the search incident to his arrest should accordingly be
upheld.
There Was Also Abundant Probable Cause to Arrest for Public Intoxication.
Alternatively, however, even if Officer Dobrowolski acted outside the scope of his
authority in ordering the protectivefriskhere, defendant's arrest was nonetheless valid on
the ground that there was simultaneous probable cause to believe that he was publicly
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intoxicated. The trial court's finding of probable cause to arrest for public intoxication is
well supported and should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
OFFICER DOBROWOLSKI ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS
AUTHORITY AS A PEACE OFFICER IN ORDERING
DEFENDANT TO SUBMIT TO A PROTECTIVE FRISK;
THEREFORE, DEFENDANT LACKED ANY RIGHT TO RESIST,
EVEN ASSUMING THE OFFICER ULTIMATELY LACKED
REASONABLE SUSPICION DEFENDANT WAS POTENTIALLY
DANGEROUS2
One of the charges dismissed in connection with defendant's plea bargain was
interference with a peace officer (R. 114-120), add. B. In Point II of his brief, defendant
challenges the legitimacy of his arrest for interference with an officer after he refused to
submit to an alleged illegal frisk.3 Aplt. Br. at 24. Specifically, defendant claims that
2

Defendant only nominally relies on state constitutional provisions and articulates
no meaningful argument for a different state constitutional analysis here. See Aplt. Br. at
18. Neither the State, nor this Court need therefore address his claim of a state
constitutional violation. See Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1006, n.l (Utah
App.), cert denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 & n.5
(Utah App. 1990) (requiring 'thoughtful and probing analysis" of state constitutional
claims).
3

In Point I of his brief defendant concedes that any detention engendered by police
questioning at the Circle K convenience store was reasonable, but disputes that Officer
Dobrowolski reasonably suspected that he was armed or otherwise dangerous such that a
protective frisk was also justified. Aplt. Br. at 18. For reasons set forth in the body of
this point, the validity of the frisk is ultimately irrelevant and therefore the State does not
respond to defendant's allegation in a separate point. In any event, in assessing the
reasonableness of the decision to frisk, "it is not essential that the officer actually be in
fear, United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976), nor need he be
'absolutely certain that the individual is armed. The issue is whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others
8

because the offense of interference with an officer requires the State to prove that Officer
Dobrowolski issued a 'lawful order," the allegedly illegal attempt to frisk here precludes
the State from establishing the requisite 'lawful" elements of the offense and requires that
he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the dismissed charge was groundless.
Aplt. Br. at 24-28. In other words, defendant interprets the interference statute as
providing that, where an officer's order violates a constitutional or statutory provision
such as the Fourth Amendment, a citizen is free to ignore or actively resist the order or
assault the officer without fear of prosecution.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the controlling issue here is not whether the
attempted frisk was justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant was potentially
dangerous, but whether the officers were acting within the scope of their authority.

was in danger.'" State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
27)).
The attempted protective frisk here was warranted. Upon responding to a dispatch
report of a man hassling customers at the Circle K store in the middle of the night, Officer
Dobrowolski observed defendant's intoxicated state and belligerent behavior (R. 166:3435, 46-49. Moreover, the first officer on the scene reported that defendant was
uncooperative or "trying to talk his way into jail" (R. 166:48). Finally, in Officer
Dobrowolski's experience intoxicated individuals "can behave unpredictably"and
"violently" (R. 166:33). The trial court found that the attempted protective frisk was
reasonable (R. 110-113), add. A, and that well supported ruling should be upheld. See
United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding protective frisk
of intoxicated defendant who backed away as police approached at night in a high crime
area; specifically noting that defendant's backward step was reasonably construed as a
hostile action, i.e., "gaining room to use a weapon").

9

A.

State v. Gardiner and Progeny are Dispositive

State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 569-570 (Utah 1991), involved a defendant's
resistance of an officer's efforts to arrest him following the officer's attempt to conduct
what was later found to be an illegal search. The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the law
in this jurisdiction, determined that there was no common law right to resist an illegal
arrest and no right to resist under the interference with an officer statute, and affirmed
defendant's conviction for interfering with an officer. Id at 574-76.
The officer in Gardiner arrived at a business location to investigate a party and
met Gardiner at the door. Id at 569. The officer stated that he intended to check the
building for minors, and, when he could not produce the search warrant demanded by
Gardiner, Gardiner aggressively blocked his entrance. Id The officer pushed Gardiner,
who responded by punching the officer in the face. Id A fight ensured and, during the
struggle, the officer informed Gardiner that he was under arrest. Id However, Gardiner
refused to stop fighting and again attacked the officer. Id Gardiner was convicted of
assault on a peace officer and interference with a peace officer under Utah Code Ann. §§
76-5-102.4 and 76-8-305 (1990). Id. at 569-70. The Utah Supreme Court found that,
regardless of the illegality of the officer's attempt to conduct a warrantless search of the
premises, Gardiner committed the charged crimes when he physically fought with the
officer before and during the officer's attempt to place him under arrest. Id at 574-75.
The supreme court rejected defendant's attempts to justify his actions against the officer,
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finding no basis in either statute to justify Gardiner's resistance to the illegal search or to
the officer's subsequent efforts to arrest him. Id See also J.H. By and Through D.H. v.
West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115, 125 n.38 (Utah 1992) (recognizing that Gardiner
requires "a citizen faced with illegal police action to submit to the action or face potential
criminal penalties if the action of the police officer is later found to be within the scope of
his authority").
After the offenses in Gardiner were committed, the interference with an officer
statute was amended. Defendant in this case was charged under a new subsection which
provides:
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or
by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace
officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or
another and interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act
required by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the
arrest or detention
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-8-305 (1995). Defendant contends that the addition of the

requirement of a "lawful order" in the interference statute requires that the State establish
the legality of the underlying attempted protective frisk before defendant's subsequent
resistance to the officer's orders will violate the statute. Aplt. Br. at 24-26.
This Court rejected a similar argument in Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003
(Utah App. 1996). Smoot was convicted of, among other things, interfering with an
11

officer as set forth in the Salt Lake City ordinances. The ordinance includes three
sections, one of which requires a "lawful command of a police officer[.]"4 Id at 10101011. This Court found it unnecessary to distinguish between the sections in order to
interpret them. Id at 1011, n.8. Relying on Gardiner, this Court noted that any right to
resist must be found in the charging statutes, then found that the inquiry relevant to the
charged ordinance was whether the officers were acting within the scope of their
authority. Id at 1010.
The same inquiry, therefore, applies in the context of the amended interference
statute. To determine whether an officer acted within the scope of his authority, this
Court in Smoot, looked to "objective indicia of how the officer is perceived." Id This
includes such facts as "whether or not the officer was in uniform and on duty, whether the
defendant knew he or she was an officer, and whether the defendant knew he or she was

4

The charged ordinance provided, in relevant part:

Every person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor who:
A. Attempts by means of any threat, force or violence to deter, interfere
with or prevent a police officer... from performing any official duty
imposed upon such officer . . . by law; or
B. Wilfully resists, physically delays or physically obstructs a police officer
. . . or fails to comply with a lawful command of a police officer . . . in the
discharge or attempt to discharge any official duty of such officer; or
C. Knowingly resists by the use of force or violence any police officer . . . . while
performing an official duty.
Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1010, 1011 (quoting Salt Lake City Code section 11.04.030)
(emphasis added).
12

being arrested." Id. Where the relevant objective indicia are present and suggest that the
officer is acting within the scope of his or her authority, no right to resist exists. Id. This
is so even where the officers are acting without a legal ground, because the illegality of an
officer's action does not justify a defendant's resistance. Id.; see also Gardiner, 814 P.2d
at 574. Accordingly, in this case, defendant's narrow interpretation of the requirement
that the officer's actions be "lawful" must be rejected in favor of the broader
interpretation called for in Gardiner and Smoot - - in determining whether defendant's
conduct violated the interference statute, Officer Dobrowolski's orders must be "lawful"
in the sense that the objective indicia provide the perception that the officer was acting
within the scope of his authority, thus giving defendant no right to resist or interfere.
B.

An Order to Submit to a Protective Frisk is Necessarily
Within the Scope of a Peace Officer's Authority

While defendant contests the basis for the protectivefrisk,he makes no claim that
Officer Dobrowolski acted outside the scope of his authority as a police officer. Aplt.
Br.24-26. Nor does he claim that he was unaware that either Officer Bushman, the first
officer on the scene, or Officer Dobrowolski, who ultimately ordered the protective frisk,
were Salt Lake City Police Officers called to investigate the Circle K clerk's complaint.
See Aplt. Br. at 18-35. Indeed, defendant knewfromhis initial conversation with Officer
Bushman that police wanted to identify him and to speak with him further about the
dispatch report that he was harassing Circle K customers (R. Ill) {see also R. 166:7-8).
Further, Officer Dobrowolski's order that defendant place his hands on his head in
13

preparation for a protective frisk was objectively designed to accomplish, without
unnecessary force, a safe environment in which to further investigate the Circle K
complaint (R. 112-113). These circumstances objectively establish that both officers
were acting within the scope of their authority as peace officers - - giving defendant no
basis upon which to resist or disobey - - and should render Officer Dobrowolski's orders
"lawful" within the meaning of the interference statute. Cf. Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 57475; Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1010-1011. This is so even if the protective frisk is ultimately
found to be have been unwarranted. See Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574.
This interpretation finds support in public policy as well. Defendant's position
would permit him to do any criminal act during or after a police illegality, so long as it is
connected in some form to the chain of events started by the police misconduct, yet
escape liability for interference with an officer. For example, defendant's position, as a
matter of public policy, would permit a suspect to actively resist and/or physically disrupt
a search using any force available as long as the search warrant was ultimately found to
be defective. This very approach was rejected in Gardiner.
Moreover, use of a broad interpretation of the "lawful" requirement does not rob
defendant of his ability to challenge the strict legality of Officer Dobrowolski's order that
he submit to a protective frisk. It simply requires that he do so within the confines of the
judicial system at a later point and accept the appropriate legal remedy instead of
employing a self help remedy. Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 572. Defendant's narrow
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interpretation would permit a defendant to make his own determination in the heat of the
moment as to the constitutional or statutory legality of the officer's actions and — if he
guesses right — to disobey or resist police. This is contrary to the Utah Supreme
Court's declaration that "questions] of legality must be determined in subsequent judicial
proceedings, not in the street." Id at 574. As the Utah Supreme Court recognized, in
today's world, individuals may legally challenge perceived illegalities in the actions of
officers and, if any are found, may pursue the appropriate remedy in the courts. Id at
572.
Notwithstanding the above, defendant nominally claims that Gardiner and its
progeny are inapplicable here on the ground that the defendants in Gardiner, Smoot and
State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1997), "had all unquestionably violated the
interference statute for resisting a lawful arrest." Aplt. Br. at 26 (citing Gardiner, 814
P.2d at 575; Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1011-12; Griego, 933 P.2d at 1009). Their distinction is
inconsequential. The supreme court and this Court clearly rejected all three defendants'
claims that a police illegality justified their resistance and/or intervening crimes. See
Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574-75; Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1010-1-12; Griego, 933 P.2d at 1008009. Although the analytical paths in Gardiner, Smoot, and Griego vary, the consistent
rule to be gleaned from them is that so long as a peace officer is acting within the scope
of his authority, even an unwarranted order must be obeyed, and such cannot be used as a
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ground to escape punishment for a simultaneous and/or intervening crime.5 Id
Significantly, defendant points to nothing in the reasoning of Gardiner, Smoot or Griego,
which reasonably suggests the results in these cases would have been different if the
arrests had been ^questionably invalid. Aplt. Br. at 26. Indeed, as noted previously, this
Court expressly recognized that even assuming the arrest in Smoot was invalid, Smoot
"still would not have been justified in resisting arrest" under Gardiner. Smoot 921 P.2d
at 1010, (citing Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574). See also Griego, 933 P.2d at 1008 (assuming
warrantless entry was illegal for purposes of analysis).
C.

Defendant's Arrest Was Also Justified Based on His
Obvious Public Intoxication

Even assuming, arguendo, that Officer Dobrowolski acted outside the scope of his
authority in ordering the protective frisk which defendant resisted, defendant's arrest was
nonetheless valid on the alternative ground that there was probable cause to believe he
was publicly intoxicated. In Point 11(B) of his brief, defendant claims that police lacked
probable cause to arrest him for public intoxication and therefore his arrest and the search
incident thereto cannot be justified on this alternative ground.6 Aplt. Br. at 27-31. The
5

Griego does not focus on the "scope of authority" analysis in Gardiner and
Smoot, but on another line of authority recognizing that "[a]n illegal entry or prior
illegality by officers does not affect the subsequent arrest of a defendant where there is an
intervening illegal act by the suspect." Id. (citing State v. Wagstaff, 846 P.2d 1311 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
6

In Point 11(C) of his brief, defendant also claims that police lacked probable cause
to arrest him for disorderly conduct and therefore his arrest and the search incident cannot
be justified on this alternative ground either. See Aplt. Br. at 28-35. However, defendant
16

trial court found that there was probable cause, or at least "close to probable cause to
arrest defendant for public intoxication" (R. 113), add. A.
The trial court's finding of probable cause to arrest for public intoxication is well
supported in the record (R. 110-112), add. A, (see R. 166:3-9, 11, 22, 26, 33-35, 46-51).
Indeed, in challenging the trial court's finding of probable cause to arrest for public
intoxication defendant fails to demonstrate any clear error. See State v. Moosman, 19A
P.2d 474, 475 (Utah 1990); State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 735 (Utah App. 1991), cert
denied, 836 P2d 1383 (Utah 1991). To show clear error in the trial court's factual
findings, defendant must "marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court' s
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack."
Moosman, 794 P.2d at 476.
Here, defendant cites only favorable evidence and inferences, wholly failing to
marshal evidence supportive of the trial court's probable cause ruling. Aplt. Br. at 27-28.

was not ultimately charged with disorderly conduct (R. 17-19); moreover, the trial court
effectively found that defendant did not commit disorderly conduct until after he was
arrested (R. 110-113), add. A. Defendant's pre-arrest resistance therefore provided no
independent or intervening basis for the arrest (id.). Accordingly, defendant's claims
regarding probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct on appeal are based on a false
premise that the legality of the attemptedfriskdefendant resisted controls, whereas under
Gardiner, the controlling fact is that the officer was acting within the scope of his
authority, a conclusion that defendant does not contest. See Aplt. Br. at 18-41. For these
reasons, defendant's claims regarding probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct on
appeal are irrelevant, including his challenge to the constitutionality of the disorderly
conduct statute, see Point 11(D), and they are not further addressed here.
17

For example, he fails to acknowledge that Officer Dobrowolski responded to a complaint
that defendant was harassing Circle K customers (R. 166:34). Nor does defendant
acknowledge that Officer Dobrowolski observed defendant's belligerent and intoxicated
behavior with Officer Bushman, and also experienced it himself in attempting the
protective frisk (R. 166:31-51). Moreover, as noted previously, Officer Dobrowolski
reasonably relied on information from Officer Bushman that defendant had been
uncooperative with him (R. 166:34-35). See State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 142
(Utah App. 1997). Finally, defendant ignores the fact that the intoxication statute applies
not only if the intoxicated actor is dangerous, but also "unreasonably disturbs other
people."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-9-701(1) (1999). Given the deficient challenge,

defendant fails to demonstrate any clear error in the trial court's factual findings in
support of the ultimate determination of probable cause to arrest for public intoxication
(R. 110-113), add. A. See State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994) (recognizing
that a trial court's legal conclusion of probable cause is afforded a "measure of
discretion"). His claim should therefore be rejected. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchg.,
817 P.2d 800, 801 (Utah 1991) (failure to comply with marshaling requirement is alone
grounds to reject challenge to trial court ruling).
In sum, defendant's arrest was justified based on his interference with a lawful
order to submit to a protective frisk, and/or his obvious public intoxication. Therefore,
the search of his person incident to the arrest was justified and the cocaine discovered as a
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result was properly seized. The trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress should
be upheld.7
CONCLUSION
Defendant's guilty plea to possession of cocaine, a third degree felony should be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on^2?August 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

7

In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court should have
suppressed the rock cocaine seizedfromhis person because it was the fruit of
unattenuated illegal police conduct. Aplt. Br. at 35 (citing e.g.9 Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). The
trial court found no illegality in officers' actions and thus did not engage in an attenuation
analysis. As stated in the body of this point, regardless of the validity of the attempted
frisk, defendant was going to be arrested and searched incident thereto for at least the
suspected public intoxication offense. He thus fails to demonstrate that an attenuation
analysis is applicable on these facts. Therefore, neither the State nor the Court need
engage in an attenuation analysis here.
19
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]
])

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

]

JACK JAMES TRANE,

]>

Case No. 981923959

Defendant

]i

Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendant's Motion to Suppress came before this Court on March 1,1999 at 1:30 P.M.
Defendant was present and represented by David S. Kottler and the State of Utah was
represented by Jennifer D. Barton, Deputy District Attorney. Both parties briefed the issues prior
to hearing. Evidence was taken at the hearing in the form of testimony by Officers Dobrowolski
and Bushman.
Findings of Fact
1.

Officer Walter Dobrowolski and Officer Randy Bushman are police officers with

Salt Lake City Police Department Both have been police officers for approximately eight years.
Both officers currently work the "graveyard shift," from 10:00 P.M. to 8:00 A.M.
2.

Officers Dobrowolski and Bushman have had specific training in the symptoms

associated with drug and alcohol use. Both officers have dealt with intoxicated citizens several
times each week for their entire careers.
3.

Based on their training and experience, Officers Dobrowolski and Bushman

believe that intoxicated persons can behave unpredictably and sometimes violently. Both are
concerned for public and officer safety when dealing with intoxicants,
4.

On November 26,1998 at about 4:12 A.M. Officers Dobrowolski and Bushman

received information that a man, later identified as the defendant, was harassing customers at the
Circle K convenience store located at 710 E. 2700 S., Salt Lake County, Utah.
5.

Officer Bushman arrived at the Circle K minutes before Officer Dobrowolski and

identified the defendant as a suspect in the disturbance complaint.
6.

The defendant was uncooperative, belligerent, and loud. The defendant was using

vulgar language, smelled of alcohol, took a fighting stance toward Officer Bushman, and
appeared angry.
7.

Officer Dobrowolski arrived and spoke with Officer Bushman. Officer Bushman

told Officer Dobrowolski that the defendant was "trying to talk his way into jail."
8.

Officer Dobrowolski approached the defendant and detected an odor of alcohol,

and noticed that the defendant was swaying slightly. Officer Dobrowolski believed the
defendant was intoxicated
9.

Officer Dobrowolski ordered the defendant to put his hands on his head and

interlock his fingers so that Officer Dobrowolski could search him. Officer Dombrowski
repeated the command two more times and each time the defendant refused.
10.

Officer Dobrowolski told the defendant he was now under arrest and told the

2

defendant to put his hands behind his back. The defendant refused.
11.

Although the defendant had not been cooperative with Officers Bushman and

Dobrowolski, he had not been verbally or physically threatening toward them prior to being
placed under arrest. Any physical resistance by the defendant, if it occurred at all, did not occur
until after the defendant had been arrested
12.

The defendant was eventually handcuffed and transported to jail, where jail

personnel searched him and located suspected controlled substances in the defendant's shoe.
Conclusions of Law
1.

The initial detention of the defendant was proper and supported by Officer

Bushman's reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or was about to
occur.
2.

Officer Bushman's reasonable articulable suspicion was created by the

information he had receivedfromdispatch regarding the defendant harassing customers, and also
by his observations at the scene. Officer Bushman's observations included the defendant's angry
demeanor, the odor of alcohol, the defendant's loud tone of voice, his refusal to cooperate, his
use of vulgar language, his assumption of afightingstance, and his unsteady balance.
3.

The "Terryfrisk"of the defendant was proper and supported by Officer

Dobrowolski's reasonable concern for his safety.
4.

Officer Dobrowolski's concern was created by his observations that defendant

appeared intoxicated, that he was uncooperative, belligerent, loud, and appeared angry. In
addition, the officer's concern for his safety was reasonable in light of the early morning hour,
the comment that Officer Bushman had made to him regarding the defendant "trying to talk his
3

way into jail," and Officer Dobrowolski's experience with intoxicants as a police officer.
5.

The defendant's arrest was proper and justified by the defendant's refusal to

comply with Officer Dobrowolski's lawful command to submit to a search. In addition, Officer
Dobrowolski had, if not probable cause, then close to probable cause to arrest the defendant for
public intoxication.
6.

Because any physical resistance by the defendant did not occur until after he was

arrested, whatever physical resistance did occur, if any, cannot provide an independent basis for
the arrest.
7.

The subsequent jailhouse search of the defendant is justified and proper as a

search incident to his arrest.

DATED this £ /

day o f O * ^ g J 9 9 9 .
BY THE COURT:
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT^*
d
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EN EL TRIBUNAL JUDICIAL DEL TERCER DISTRITO
CONDADO DE SALT LAKE, ESTADO DE UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
EL ESTADO DE UTAH,

B,8

JR,CT*%'*-'
=<riit

J u d i c l a l Di

Plaintiff;
El Dcmandante,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT,
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER
EL DOCUMENTO DECLARATORIO DEL
ACUSADO, LOS CERTIFICADOS DE LOS
ABOGADOS Y LA ORDEN DEL JUEZ

versus
contra

CASE NO.
N°DECASO

3^u ^

(—A.

1 d

ic\25^'"i

*^K

Defendant
El Acusado

COMES NOW s ) « t >
')T
acknowledges and certifies the following:
COMPARECE
reconoce y certifica lo siguiente:

r,

_, the defendant in this case, and hereby
_, el acusado en este caso, y por este medio

I am entering a pica of guilty to thefollowingcrime(s):
Me declaro culpable del siguiente delito(s):

CRJMEft STATUTORY

DEGREE

PROVISION

EL PEUTQ YIA PISPQSICIQN
gSTABLECPAfORLALEY

GRADO

PUNISHMENT
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

EiCASTlOO
Minimo, maximo y/o
minimo obligatorio
•s/'

fe/tfv 7

T$~o^

'R -

-V'

^ re

c.

D.

3/18/99

V

-2I have received a copy of the Information against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature
and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading guilty.
He recibido una copia del Documento Acusatono, la he leido, y entiendo la naturaleza y los elementos
del delito(s) por el cual me declaro culpable.
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows:
Los elementos del delito(s) del cual se me acusa son los siguientes:

^ ^ v y , ^ ^

ay^^

,^ U ^

k c v ^ ' i y

Jo

S<L*-S

V^r-

My conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable that constitutes
the elements of the crime(s) charged is as follows:
Mi conductay la conducta de otras personas por la cual soy penalmente responsable, y que constituye
los elementos del delito(s) imputado, es la siguiente:

Q-*

T^« V ^ — W <

i *<s go,sf . ^ w ^

?•( „ r ? ? #

~ty*-n

ft III-- « < r*-*J*-<*/ ^

<*~°^^
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I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the
following facts:
Doy entrada a esta declaraci6n(es) voluntariamente y con el conocimiento y el entendimiento de la
siguiente information:
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one,
an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no coat to me. I recognize that a condition of my sentence
may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the Court, to recoup the coat of counsel if so
appointed for me.
1. Se que tengo el derecho a ser representado por un abogado, y a
uno, el tribunal me asignariun abogado sin cobrarme. Reconozco que una condicion de mi pena puede ser que
se me requiera pagar una cantidad, determinada por el tribunal, para reembolsar el costo del abogado, si es que
se me asignara uno.
2. I Qiavejrot) (have) waived my right to counsel If I have waived my right to counsel, I have
done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:
2. (No he) (he) renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado. Si he renunciado al derecho a tener un
abogado, lo he hecho a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente por las siguientes razones:

[\<:

3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and understand the nature
and dements of the charges, my rights in this case and other proceedings, and the consequences of my
plea of guilty.
3. Si he rcnunciado al derecho a tener un abogado, he ltido este documento y entiendo la naturaleza
y los elementos de los cargos, mis derechos en este caso y otros actos procesales, y las consecuencias de mi
declaration de culpabilidad.
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is | ) ft-*/ ^ < V-^ rT^JrJtnd I
have had an opportunity to fully discuss this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty
plea with my attorney.
4. Si no he renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado, mi abogado es
,
y he tenido la oportimidad de hablar con mi abogado en detalle sobre este documento, mis derechos y las
consecuencias de mi declaration de culpabilidad.
5. I know that I have a right to a speedy trial in open court by an impartial jury and that I am
giving up that right by pleading guilty.
5. Si que tengo el derecho a tener un juicio publico sin demora ante un jurado impartial, y que al
declararme culpable renuntio a ese derecho.
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to compd
my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court in my behalf. I understand that I am
giving up these rights if I plead guilty.
6. Se que si deseo tener un juicio, tengo el derecho a carear y repreguntar a los testigos en mi contra,
o hacer que mi abogado les repregunte. Tambien si que tengo el derecho a obligar a mis testigo(s), por medio
de uncitatorio costeadopor el Estado, a testificar a mi favor en el tribunal Entiendo que al declararme culpable
renuntio a estos derechos.
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf; bnt if I choose not to do so, I cannot
be compdled to testify or give evidence against myself; and no adverse inferences will be drawn against
me if I do not testify. I understand that I am giving up these rights if I plead guilty.
7.
Si que tengo el derecho a testificar ami favor, pero si elijo no hacerlo, no seme puede obligar
a testificar o a dar pruebas en mi contra, y ninguna inf crentiadesfevorablesesacaracnmicontrasinotcstifico.
Entiendo que al declararme culpable renuntio a estos derechos.
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and the
matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each element
of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous.
8. Se que si deseo disputar la acusacion, solo necesito declararme inocente y el asunto sefijarapara
un juicio. En el juicio el Estado de Utah tendra la obligation de probar cada elemento de la acusacion sin que
quepa duda razonable. Si el juicio es ante un jurado, el veredicto tiene que ser unanime.

-49. I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the right of a presumption of innocence. I
understand that I am presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if
this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead guilty. I understand that I give up the right to the presumption
of innocence if I plead guilty.
9. Entiendo que como acusado gozo del derecho a la presuncion de inocencia. Entiendo que se supone
que soy inocente hasta que el Estado pruebe en un juicio ante un jurado que soy culpable sin que quepa duda
razonable, o hasta que me declare culpable si decido no tener un juicio. Entiendo que renuncio al derecho a la
presuncion de inocencia si me declaro culpable.
10. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the
Judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or,
where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal,
those costs would be paid by the State. L understand that I am giving up t h m rights if I plead guilty..
10. Se que bajo la Constitucion de Utah, si el jurado o el Juez me enjuiciara y condenara, tendria el
derecho a apelar mi condena y pena en la Corte de Apelaciones de Utah o, donde se permita, en la Corte
Suprema de Utah, y si no tuviera los fondos para pagar por los gastos de tal apelacion, esos gastos los pagaria
el Estado. Entiendo que renuncio a estos derechos si me declaro culpable.
11. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which I plead guilty.
I know that by pleading guilty to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence, I will be
subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentence
may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine, an
eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to
make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges
that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this plea agreement
11. Sc cual es la pena maxima que se puede imponer por cada delito por el cual me declaro culpable.
Se que al declararme culpable de un delito que lleva una pena minima obligatoria, me estare sometiendo a
cumplir esa pena minima obligatoria por ese delito. Se que las penas pueden ser consecutivas y pueden consists
en una condena penitenciaria, una multa, o ambas. Si que ademas de una multa, se impondra un recargo de
ochenta y cinco por ciento (85%). Tambien se que el Juez me puede ordenar indemnizar a cualquier victima(s)
de mis delitos, incluyendo cualquier restitution que se deba en los cargos retirados como resultado de este
convenio declaratorio, si estos existieran.
12. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for an additional
amount if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
12. Se que el encarcelamiento puede ser por periodos consecutivos, o la multa en una cantidad
adicional, si me declaro culpable de mis de un delito. Tambien si que si estoy bajo libertad condicional
probatoria ("probation"), o libertad preparatoria ("parole"), o esperando la imposition de la pena por otro delito
del cual he sido condenado o por el cual me he declarado culpable, mi declaracidndeculpabilidadenlapresente
action puede resultar en que se me impongan penas consecutivas.
13. I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up my statutory
and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such plea(s),
I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the
crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered.
13. Se y entiendo que al declaranne culpable renuncio a los derechos legates y constitucionales
enumerados en los parrafos anteriores. Tambien se que al dar entrada a tal declaracion(es), admito que he
cometido la conducta que se alega y que soy culpable del delito(s) por el cual se da entrada a mi declaracion(es).

-514. My plea(s) of guilty (»9) (is not) the result of a plea bargain between myself and the
prosecuting attorney. The promise^ duties, and provisions of thb plea bargain, if any, are fiiliy
contained in this statement.
14 Mi declaracion de culpabilidad (es) (no es) el resultado de un convemo declaratono entre el
abogado acusador y yo Las promesas, obkgactones y estipulaciones de este convemo declaratono, si existen
algunas, se encuentran en su totalidad en este documento.
15. I know and understand that any motion to withdraw my plea(s) of guilty must be for good
cause, in writing, and must be filed within thirty (30) days after entry of my guilty plea.
15
Se y entiendo que cualquier peticidn para retirar mi declaracion(es) de culpabilidad ha de
mterponerse dentro de trernta (30) dias despues de dar entrada a dicha declaracion(es), y esto ha de ser por
escnto, y debe existir causa justificada.
16. I know that any charge or sentencing concession, or recommendation of probation or
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney, is not binding on the Judge. I also know that any opinions
they express to me as to what they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court
16. Se que el Juez no aene que regirse por cualquier concesidn de cargo o de pena, o recomendacion
de libcrtad condicional probatona o pena suspendida, mcluyendo una reduccion de los cargos para la imposicion
de la pena hecha o sokcitada por el abogado defensor o el abogado acusador. Tambien se que el Juez tampoco
tiene que regirse por cualquier opinion que me expresen en cuanto a lo que ellos crean que pueda hacer el Juez.
17. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind has been made to induce me to plead
guilty, and no promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
17 No se me ha amenazado, coaccionado, o mftwcnaarto ilegahnente para inducinne a declaranne
culpable, y no se me ha hecho mnguna promesa excepto las contenidas en este documento.
18. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand
its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement I do not
wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct
18 He leido este documento, o mi abogado me lo ha lddo, y entiendo sus estipulaciones. Se que
puedo cambiar o tachar cualquier cosa contemda en este documento. No deseo hacer mngun cambio porquc
todas las afirmaciones son correctas.
19. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
19. Estoy satisfecho con cl ascsoramiento y U ayuda de mi abogado.
20. I am J / years of age; I have attended school through the 1 ^ g r a d e : and I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my
judgment when the decision was made to enter the piea(s). I am not presently under the influence of any
drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment
20 Tengo
alios de edad, he asistido a la escuda hasta el
grado y puedo leer y entender
cspafiol. Si no entiendo ingles, se me ha proporcionado un inrtrprete. No estaba bajo la influencia de mnguna
droga, medicamento o bebida alcohdlica que pudiera perjudicar mi critcrio cuando se tomo la decision de dar
entrada a la declaracion(es) Actualmente no estoy bajo la influencia de ninguna droga, medicamento o bebida
alcoholica que pequdique mi cnteno.

-621. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind; mentally capable of understanding the
proceedings and the consequences of my plea; and free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that
would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
21.
Creo estar en sano juicio, con capacidad mental de entender los actos procesales y las
consecuencias de mi declaracion, y libre de cualquier enfennedad mental, defecto o impedimento que me
previniera dar entrada a mi declaracion a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente.
22.
22.

Other:
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CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
EL CERTIFICADO DEL ABOGADO DEFENSOR

J
r^^ju
I certify that I am the attorney for ^ A , O V _, the defendant above, and
that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; and I have discussed it with
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated;
and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing
affidavit, are accurate and true.
Certifico que soy el abogado de
, el antedicho acusado(a), y se
que el (ella) ha lcido el documento, o que se lo he leido yo, y lo he discutido con 61 (ella), y creo que entiende
el significado del contenido en su totalidad, y creo que esti mental yfisicamentecompetente. A mi leal saber
y entender, despues de una investigacidn apropiada, los elementos del delito(s) y la sinopsis factual de la
conducta delictiva del acusado estan estipulados correctamente, y estos, junto con las otras proclamaciones y
afirmaciones hechas por el acusado en el affidavit anterior, son certeros y verdaderos.
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-7CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
EL CERTIFICADO DEL ABOGADO ACUSADOR
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
defendant I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's
criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats,
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court
There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for
the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the
public interest
Certifico que soy el abogado del Estado de Utah en la causa en contra de
,
el acusado. He revisado este Documento Declaratono del Acusado y encuentro que la base factual de la
conduct* delictiva del acusado que constituye el delito es verdadera y correcta. No se le ha ofrecido al acusado
ningun inccntivo inapropiado, amenaza o coaccion para alentar una declaration de culpabilidad. Las
negociaciones declaratohas se encuentran en su totalidad en el Documento y en el Convenio Declaratono, o
como complemento en las actas del tribunal. Existe motivofimdadopara creer que la prueba respaldaria la
condena del acusado por el delito(s) ante el cual se da entrada a la declaracion(es), y la aceptacion de esta
dcclaracion(es) beneficiaria a la ciudadania.
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ORDER
LAORDENDELJUEZ
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and
counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is freely and
voluntarily made, and it b so ordered that the defendant's plea(s) of guilty to the charges) set forth in
the Statement be accepted and entered.
Basado en los hechos presentados en el Documento anterior y la certification del acusado y de los
abogados, el Juez atcstigua las finnas y detennma que la declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad del acusado se hace
libre y voluntariamente, y asi se ordena que la declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad del acusado por el cargo(s)
expuesto en el Documento sea aceptada y asentada.
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